Lincoln vs. Davis: The War of the Presidents
“a fascinating comparison between these two men and their development under the pressures of war.”
The American Civil War was the only time in our history there were two presidents trying to serve as commander-in-chief for a nation at war. Although there have been many biographies of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln, as the author points out in his introduction, none have offered a detailed examination of their formation and performance as wartime politicians and strategists. This volume offers a unique perspective on the two men who uniquely shaped how their respective governments organized and conducted their war plans and why Lincoln was ultimately more successful.
When Abraham Lincoln was sworn in as the 16th president in March 1861, he faced a significant set of political and military challenges. The slave states of the deep south had seceded and were attempting to set up a competing government. Much of the U.S. Army officer corps had resigned and headed to their home states in the south and there were deep divisions in his new Administration about how to handle the rebellious states. Coupled with Lincoln’s own lack of military experience and the U.S. government was in turmoil.
The situation was no better in the new Confederate States government. Trying to create a new government from scratch while nervously watching what the new Lincoln Administration would do led to equal amounts of indecision. Initially, Davis had a misplaced hope that several so-called “border states” such as Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia would remain neutral in the likely conflict and prevent the Union forces from invading the Confederacy. He knew the military resources of the Confederacy were limited and likely to stay that way without significant foreign material support, which required the recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate new nation.
Lincoln blundered badly in the early days of his Administration, particularly regarding how to handle the retention of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, the most likely flashpoint for starting an actual war. When Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, both Lincoln and Davis, now officially the provisional president of the Confederacy, tried to determine their strategy. Lincoln immediately called for volunteers to put down the rebellion while Davis tried to put together an army to defend a much larger country than he originally intended as several border states, most critically Virginia, seceded and sought membership in the new Confederacy.
The critical political and social issue facing both Lincoln and Davis was, of course, slavery. At the beginning of the war, neither president wanted to make the slavery a central part of their political strategy. Lincoln sought to avoid antagonizing the border states that did not secede, particularly Kentucky and Maryland, while Davis immediately knew the issue would be an impediment to the recognition of the Confederacy by European governments, particularly England, that would be critical to the independence of the South.
In August 1861 when Union General John Fremont declared martial law in Missouri and issued a highly controversial “contraband” order that allowed Union forces to seize the property, including slaves, of southern supporters, Lincoln faced his first real political test on the issue and, according to the author, failed miserably. Although Lincoln ordered Fremont to rescind the order to satisfy pro-Union southerners, Davis immediately recognized the political danger such an order posed to the Confederacy, both in terms of the military need for 3.5 million slaves to the southern war effort and the potential impact on critical European opinion.
As the author notes, Lincoln, although he had much less military experience than Davis, who was a famous regimental commander from the Mexican War, he had better political instincts and was a quick study, surviving his early missteps while dealing with conspiratorial Cabinet members like William Seward and mediocre generals like George McClellan. When Lincoln fully mobilized the industrial and human capital of the Union the outcome of the war was never in doubt from a military perspective. Combined with his eventual decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation as both an instrument of war and a political rallying cry for the ending of slavery, the political outcome was never in doubt as the potential for European recognition of the Confederacy became doubtful.
Jefferson Davis faced insurmountable obstacles that even the operational prowess of his military could not overcome. The Confederacy could not handle what became a long war of attrition and the political and societal anchor of slavery ultimately meant that foreign recognition would never occur. Davis also faced the impossible situation of having to defend too much territory with too few troops and practically no navy, and every battle won or lost removed more Confederate resources that could not be replaced.
This is a fascinating comparison between these two men and their development under the pressures of war. Lincoln began as an unsure politician who wanted to always see the good in people despite their foibles and shortcomings, while Davis began as one of the most notable leaders in the south who never quite understood that the conflict was truly the first total war between northern and southern societies and not just a military contest. But Lincoln had better political instincts and was willing to change with circumstances and eventually grew into one of the most respected wartime presidents in American history.