Forged in War: A Military History of Russia from Its Beginnings to Today
“provides an outstanding primer to understanding Russia’s military and strategic mindset and why and how Russia is conducting military operations under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.”
Like many ambitious European powers, Russia has a complicated history dominated by conflict, expansion, and imperialism. Following his recently published Putin’s Wars, the author goes back to the beginnings of the state of Russia, showing how a complicated strategic situation, ethnic and religious strife, and cultural insecurities have all shaped not only Russia’s history, but the current worldview of Vladimir Putin.
Beginning with the tribes and chieftains that would form the first vestiges of Russia, the author describes how competing princes, dukes, and khans began the formation of both a way of war and a political dynamic built on an authoritarian leader.
Beginning with the reign of the first Tsar Ivan the Terrible was the Grand Price of Moscow from 1533–1537 until his death in 1584. Another Tsar, Peter the Great, Russia tries to assume a role as a European power, with an ambitious military modernization program and the first beginnings of a Russian Navy. Lagging behind other major powers in terms of technology, doctrine, and organization, the author describes a rapidly modernizing nation struggling to become a modern military power while clinging to an archaic economic and social structure built on the serfdom of large segments of the population.
The author does a good job of weaving both localized conflicts with regional powers like Turkey and Sweden with Russia’s role in larger conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars, the first of many wars that would see confident foreign invaders plunging deep into Russia, only to be swallowed up by the vast distances of the steppes which strained supply lines and the cruel Russian winters that often seemed to be an ally. The Russians fought nearly as many defensive conflicts as offensive wars of conquest, all of which served to form both the Russian way of war and the perpetual Russian strategic mindset of being surrounded by potential invaders and the need to seek both border security and the military ability to secure Russian interests.
As Russia moved into the 20th century, their history saw the decay of military prowess that led to an ignoble defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and the final defeat and destruction of the Romanov dynasty in World War I. The Russian military simply couldn’t modernize as fast as the other rapidly rising European powers, especially Germany, and the country’s political and social structure could not stand up to the needs of a total war.
Ironically, Russian military power probably reached its zenith under communism, as the harsh industrialization of the new Soviet Union and the rapid introduction of mechanization ushered in the juggernaut of the World War II Red Army that would assume the primary responsibility of defeating Hitler’s legions and conquering most of Eastern Europe, finally providing Russia with the long-sought buffer zone against perceived enemies in Western Europe.
But the political and societal shortfalls of communism eventually caused the downfall of this military machine as the Soviet Union could not keep up with the rapid technology developments of the West during the 1980s and 1990s, and the creaky economic underpinnings of socialism could not maintain a military empire the size of the Red Army.
Finally, the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the virtual disintegration of their military through the 1990s into the 2000s is chronicled along with the rise of Vladimir Putin, who was determined to rebuild Russia as a global military power and regain the sphere of influence of the newly independent former Soviet Republics formed along a newly vulnerable border. This renewed desire for a greater Russia eventually led to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, where the Russian military’s shortfalls in training, doctrine, and small unit leadership turned what Putin hoped was a “shock and awe” conquest of Ukraine into a grueling war of attrition.
Some recurring themes run through the book and the author does an interesting job of tying a particular period, battle, campaign, or ruler to current Russian politics. Vladimir Putin has a definite, if very warped, sense of Russian history, and the author does an excellent job of tying together conflicts, particularly concerning what is now Ukraine, and Putin’s worldview used to justify his aggression.
Some other themes explored by author include the constant state of Russian imitation, but not quite duplication of Western military capabilities and technology, the continuing challenge of the Russian state, whether imperial, communist, or authoritarian, with the logistics of warfare, and the steady use of sheer numbers to dominate on the battlefield with a constant disregard for casualties.
Combined with his earlier volume, this duo provides an outstanding primer to understanding Russia’s military and strategic mindset and why and how Russia is conducting military operations under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. It puts into context the Russian psyche that seems to drive their foreign and security policy throughout their history as a country.